Minimalism and speakers’ intuitions by Gariazzo, Matías
ideas y valores · vol. lx · n.o 146 • agosto de 2011 • issn 0120-0062 • bogotá, colombia • páginas 97 - 110
Minimalism and Speakers’ Intuitions
El minimalismo y las intuiciones de los hablantes
MATÍAS GARIAZZO*
Universidad de la República – Uruguay
Abstract
Minimalism proposes a semantics that does not account for speakers’ intuitions 
about the truth conditions of a range of sentences or utterances. Thus, a challenge 
for this view is to offer an explanation of how its assignment of semantic contents 
to these sentences is grounded in their use. Such an account was mainly offered 
by Soames, but also suggested by Cappelen and Lepore. The article criticizes this 
explanation by presenting four kinds of counterexamples to it, and arrives at the 
conclusion that minimalism has not successfully answered the above-mentioned 
challenge.
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Resumen
El minimalismo propone una semántica que no da cuenta de las intuiciones de 
los hablantes acerca de las condiciones de verdad de una gama de proposiciones 
o enunciados. Por lo tanto, uno de los retos que enfrenta dicha posición es el de 
brindar una explicación de cómo su atribución de contenidos semánticos a estas 
proposiciones se fundamenta en el uso. Dicha explicación fue ofrecida princi-
palmente por Soames pero también sugerida por Cappelen y Lepore. El artículo 
desarrolla una crítica de esta explicación mediante cuatro tipos de contraejemplos 
y llega a la conclusión de que el minimalismo no logra responder exitosamente al 
reto que se le plantea.
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The view that philosophers like Cappelen-Lepore (2005a) and 
Emma Borg (2007) call “minimalism” constitutes an approach to the 
semantics/pragmatics distinction. An important feature of this view 
is that it deliberately proposes a semantics that does not account for 
speakers’ intuitions about the truth conditions of a range of sentences 
or utterances.1-2 Therefore, an important challenge that this view faces 
is offering an explanation of how its attribution of semantic contents 
to these sentences is grounded in their use, so that it would not be 
unwarranted. The main explanation provided so far is that offered 
by Soames (2002 55-109) but also suggested by Cappelen and Lepore 
(2005a 2000). 3-4 The purpose of this essay is to criticize this explana-
tion by presenting four kinds of counterexamples to it. The essay has 
three sections. In the first one, I briefly characterize minimalism and 
present the mentioned explanation. In the second one, I criticize this 
explanation by means of four counterexamples. Finally, in the third 
section, I make some general remarks about the relevance of the in-
tuitions referred to for a theory of natural language. 
I
According to the view that Cappelen and Lepore call “minima-
lism”, every declarative sentence in context semantically expresses a 
proposition (that is, a content that specifies truth conditions) that is a 
function of the contents of the constituent parts of the sentence and 
1 Although there is agreement in considering that the minimalist semantic treatment 
of certain sentences does not account for speakers’ intuitions, different kinds of con-
textualists disagree on whether this treatment in some way respects these intuitions 
in the case of the rest of the sentences. 
2 As Recanati observes (14-16), the only way to test speakers’ intuitions about the truth 
conditions of a given sentence or utterance, is to test the intuitions about its truth 
value in different circumstances of evaluation. 
3 Soames (2005 361-366) and Cappelen (Cappelen & Hawthorne) subsequently give up 
the minimalist view. 
4 There is at least another explanation that is convincingly criticized by Clapp (256, 
260), namely the one due to Borg (2004 84). This account basically consists in clai-
ming that a clause like “‘The cat is on the mat’ is true if and only if THE CAT IS ON THE 
MAT”, where the sentence in capital letters corresponds to a sentence in the language 
of thought, indicates which are the truth makers of the sentence “The cat is on the 
mat”. The content of both sentences (that which belongs to the English language and 
that which belongs to the language of thought) would be the same, and thus we could 
explain how the attribution of minimal contents to English sentences is grounded 
in psychological facts. As Clapp shows, this supposed explanation reproduces at the 
level of the language of thought (granting for the sake of argument that this is not a 
problematic notion) the problems that we find at the level of natural language. 
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its syntactic structure. The influence of context in determining this 
proposition is reduced to the provision of contents to a certain limited 
number of expressions present in the syntactic surface, typically ex-
pressions that are obviously indexical and words or aspects of them that 
indicate tense (Cappelen and Lepore call the set of expressions that mi-
nimalism considers context sensitive “the Basic Set” [2005a 2-4]).5 Thus, 
minimalism accepts the principle of compositionality and restricts in 
a particular way the intervention of context in the determination of 
sentences’ truth conditions. In the several cases where this view as-
signs truth conditions that do not account for speakers’ intuitions, 
the strategy used to explain the existence of these intuitions usually 
consists in distinguishing between the semantic content of the uttered 
sentence and the content or contents of its utterance, and claiming that 
speakers do not discriminate between them. Most of the contents of 
the utterance –the semantic content is usually considered one of these 
contents– are considered to be only pragmatically communicated.
On the other hand, according to the theories of those that 
Cappelen and Lepore call “radical contextualists”, no sentence in con-
text or utterance semantically expresses a proposition, at most only a 
propositional scheme.6 The truth conditions of a sentence’s utterance 
could be considered to correspond to those of a certain pragmatically 
communicated proposition usually called “what is said”, which would 
be directly revealed by the speakers’ intuitions about the utterance’s 
truth conditions (Recanati 13-20). An intermediate stance is adopted 
by those whom the above-mentioned authors call “moderate contex-
tualists”. According to their theories, although most or all sentences 
in context semantically express a proposition, there are more expres-
sions that require the intervention of context in order to determine 
this proposition than those that minimalism acknowledges, such as 
quantifier expressions, adverbs like “ready” and “sufficient”, or verbs 
5 Cappelen and Lepore (2005a 1-4) add to this list expressions like “enemy” or “neigh-
bor”, and Borg (2007 355-357) rejects the inclusion of any indexical that requires the 
intervention of pragmatic factors in order to determine its reference. 
6 Thus, according to radical contextualism, semantics, strictly speaking, deals with the 
conventional meaning of expression-types, relying on which speakers pragmatically 
communicate contents that specify truth conditions. According to this view, there 
is usually no contextual intervention that, because it is specifically required by the 
linguistic meaning of the uttered sentence, allows us to express or communicate a 
proposition that could be considered the semantic content of this sentence. Then, for 
radical contextualists the primary bearers of propositional content are utterances 
–that is certain intentional acts– not sentences. As Cappelen and Lepore point out 
(2005b 50), this does not prevent radical contextualists from considering sentences as 
derived bearers of content.
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like “rain”.7 We have to add to this classification those theories known 
as relativistic, which consider that the truth value of certain sentences 
is obtained by relating their content not only to a world but also to 
at least one other extra parameter. All these views are different from 
minimalism in their methodological approach towards speakers’ in-
tuitions about truth conditions: while minimalist theories are not 
concerned with accounting for these intuitions when they assign se-
mantic contents to sentences in context, the other theories consider 
that these intuitions are at least very important evidence for any truth 
conditions that could be reasonably assigned.8
Minimalism finds important motivation in the fact that it offers 
a very simple way of preserving compositionality, a preservation that 
allows for both the development of a formal truth conditional seman-
tics for a natural language and an appealing account of the speakers’ 
ability to produce and comprehend a potentially infinite number of 
7 Cappelen and Lepore (2005a 8) point out three strategies that moderate contextua-
lists could use in order to explain the context sensitivity of an expression e outside 
the basic set. The first one consists in assigning to e different contents in different 
contexts. The second one consists in postulating an expression in the logical form of 
the sentences that contain e whose content changes across contexts. The last one con-
sists in postulating a constituent of the propositions expressed by the sentences that 
contain e that is not syntactically articulated (in spite of its presence being required 
by the content of e) and that varies across contexts. 
8 Recanati (83-97) adopts another classification of the theories according to which a 
theory is called “minimalist” insofar as it recognizes the intervention of context in 
the determination of a sentence’s truth conditions only when that intervention is ne-
cessary to express a proposition, and a theory is called “contextualist” insofar as it 
does not conceive in this way the mechanisms of context sensitivity. According to this 
criterion of classification, certain theories that Cappelen and Lepore call “moderate 
contextualist” are called “minimalist”, namely those that postulate the existence of 
indexical expressions hidden in deep syntax. I adopt the classification of Cappelen-
Lepore and Borg because it discriminates between two distinct attitudes towards 
speakers’ intuitions in which I am interested in this essay. The line of argument used 
by authors like Stanley (minimalists according to Recanati’s classification and mode-
rate contextualists according to Cappelen and Lepore’s) to criticize the theories that 
postulate unarticulated constituents does not consist in claiming that speakers’ in-
tuitions about truth conditions are semantically irrelevant, but in trying to show that 
there are no cases in which we must postulate unarticulated constituents in order 
to semantically account for these intuitions; there would always be syntactic eviden-
ce that shows that the supposedly unarticulated constituents are in fact articulated. 
These authors usually present their syntactic proofs together with a defense –by means 
of context shifting and incompleteness arguments, which are based on speakers’ in-
tuitions– of the claim that we are in the presence of a context sensitive sentence. As 
Cappelen and Lepore point out (2005a 18-21, 72-73), if the binding proofs of the exis-
tence of a domain variable that cohabits with every noun phrase were correct, they 
would only prove the existence of the variable, not that its value varies across contexts.
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sentences based on a finite number of resources. But insofar as mini-
malism lacks a satisfactory account of how its proposed attribution of 
semantic contents to certain sentences is grounded in their use, it can 
be accused of being a view devised in an ad hoc way in order to obtain 
the mentioned outcomes. Now, the proponents of minimalism have 
attempted to offer such an explanation, the most developed of which I 
will present in what follows.
Soames (2002 55-109) tries to detect the regularity in the use of an 
expression that reveals the competence conditions for its use and thus 
also its semantic content. According to him, the proposition seman-
tically expressed by a non-ambiguous sentence free of expressions 
included in the Basic Set, is the one that speakers communicate and 
even assert by uttering this sentence in any normal context. The no-
tions of communication and assertion are pragmatic notions by means 
of which the actual use of an expression would be contemplated: that 
which a speaker communicates or asserts depends on his intention 
and on the conversational presuppositions present in the context 
of utterance. The distinction made by Soames (id . 83-85) between 
merely communicating, on the one hand, and also asserting, on the 
other, lies in the nature of the speaker’s commitment to the truth of 
the communicated proposition and on the character of the inference 
that the audience has to make in order to reach the proposition based 
on the utterance: in both cases the speaker assumes a certain com-
mitment to defend the truth of the communicated proposition, but in 
the case of an assertion the commitment is stronger and the inference 
that the audience has to make is more obvious. In turn, a normal con-
text is one in which a sentence is used literally (that is, among other 
things, not metaphorically and without sarcasm or irony) and with its 
conventional linguistic meaning.9 On the other hand, a sentence that 
contains Basic Set expressions and/or ambiguous expressions would 
express the proposition that is asserted in every normal context in 
which these expressions receive the same semantic treatment. Thus, 
the proposition semantically expressed by a sentence would be the 
minimal information communicated by its utterance in any context 
and, consequently, it is reasonable to assume that its communication 
would be required by the speakers’ semantic competence.
Given that according to Soames, every time a proposition is as-
serted all its more obvious entailments are asserted too, the previous 
criterion for individuating semantic contents does not deliver a unique 
proposition for each sentence. For this reason, Soames (2002 105-107) 
supplements his criterion with the requirement that the proposition 
9 Cappelen and Lepore (2005a) do not use the notion of normal context.
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semantically expressed must explain why its obvious entailments are 
also always asserted, but not vice versa. Thus, the final account of how 
the proposition semantically expressed by a sentence is individuated 
is roughly the following: a proposition is semantically expressed by 
a sentence if and only if (i) it is asserted in all normal contexts that 
satisfy the stated requirements concerning Basic Set and ambiguous 
expressions, and (ii) its assertion explains why any other proposition 
that satisfies (i) is asserted, but not vice versa.10
II
As we shall see, with respect to certain sentences whose treatment 
typically distinguishes minimalism from moderate contextualism, it 
is clear that the above stated criterion does not allow us to individuate 
the content that minimalism assigns to them nor any other content. 
Before considering these cases, it is worth pointing out that, for the 
sake of argument, the objection I will make in what follows grants 
minimalism certain points that could be disputed. Soames usually 
explains the assertion of a minimal proposition claiming that it is 
entailed by another asserted proposition that the speaker has –in 
Soames’ terms– the primary intention of asserting. It is this proposi-
tion that would be mainly responsible for the intuitions we have about 
the truth conditions of the sentence’s utterance in a certain context. 
But, in the case of many sentences, it could be questioned whether 
speakers do communicate such a proposition. Moreover, the notion 
of assertion (or that of communication) according to which every 
relatively obvious entailment of a primarily asserted (or only commu-
nicated) proposition is also asserted (or only communicated) could 
also be disputed. The cases that I will present below show that even 
granting these points, the account just presented is unsatisfactory.
The first case consists in a propositional attitude report and was 
first presented by Soames (2005 361-366), who offers an answer to it 
that he later abandons together with the minimalist view. In his book, 
Soames focuses his attention on the semantics of proper names and 
indexicals, defending the theses of direct reference and semantic in-
nocence. According to the former thesis, a simple sentence containing 
proper names or indexicals expresses a singular proposition (that is, a 
10 Soames (2002 105-107) in fact proposes two criteria that according to him circum-
scribe the same semantic contents for the same sentences. The criterion outlined in 
the main text is the one that receives most of Soame’s attention, presumably because, 
unlike the other, it would allow him to explain how his proposal of minimal seman-
tic contents is grounded in linguistic use. The alternative criterion, insofar as it is 
formulated in terms of the notion of semantic convention, cannot give us such an 
explanation. 
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structured proposition that contains the individuals denoted by these 
expressions and not conditions to be satisfied by them) 11, and according 
to the most usual version of the latter, this same proposition composes 
the more complex ones expressed by attitude ascribing sentences in 
which the previous simple sentence is embedded. In turn, minimalism 
accepts, at the same time, the principle of compositionality (which 
entails that a sentence’s context sensitivity is always traceable to an 
element of its syntax) and considers that in a propositional attitude 
report of the form “A v that p” there is no context sensitive expression 
(understanding context in such a way that it includes the linguistic 
context in which an expression occurs) outside the embedded sen-
tence and the initial nominal expression.12 Thus, from the minimalist 
view and these theses it follows that co-denoting names and indexicals 
are substitutable salva veritate in propositional attitude contexts, and 
that a propositional attitude report which contains such expressions 
does not have different truth conditions in two contexts in which they 
preserve their designations. In other words, from these assumptions 
it follows that in all contexts the semantic content of a propositional 
attitude report in which names or indexicals occur in the embedded 
sentence consists of the same relation and relata (the subject of the 
ascription and certain singular proposition). Thus, the acceptance of 
minimalism excludes the adoption of a referentialist theory accord-
ing to which something like the way in which a subject has a certain 
attitude toward a singular proposition could be relevant to the truth 
conditions of a report whose embedded sentence contains names or 
indexicals. According to Soames, this criterion delivers these minimal 
(and referentialist) contents for this kind of reports.13 
From such a perspective, Soames considers an utterance of (1) in 
the following context. 
11 It is worth pointing out that Soames (2002 110-130) recognizes the existence of names 
with descriptive content, and so the previously mentioned thesis would concern only 
those names that he considers “purely referential”.
12 It could be claimed that English attitude reports of the form “A v that p” contain a 
Basic Set expression in its superficial syntax, namely “that”. But it is dubious that this 
expression is the one which obviously figures as a demonstrative in other English 
sentences; it seems that it does not even belong to the same grammatical category. 
Evidence for this is that most of the translations of these sentences to other languages 
do not exhibit an expression that is syntactically identical to an obviously indexical 
one. In part for this reason, minimalist theories do not usually consider the expres-
sion “that” which occurs in these last English sentences as a demonstrative.
13 Soames claims that (2002 131-146), since there is no description associated with a 
name or indexical in all normal contexts in which these expressions are used with 
the same designations, the proposition asserted in all these contexts by an utterance 
of a sentence that contains such expressions is singular. 
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(1) Mary has just learnt that Peter Hempel is Carl Hempel.
In a Princeton philosophy department party, Mary learns that 
the famous philosopher of science called “Carl Hempel” is a certain 
man who is at the party and other guests call “Peter Hempel”. One of 
the guests realizes this after a conversation with Mary, and then utters 
(1) addressing another guest. Two conversational presuppositions 
between them are that Carl Hempel has two names, “Carl Hempel” 
and “Peter Hempel”, and that Mary is a rational person who does not 
commit obvious contradictions.
The proposition that would be the semantic content of (1) –namely 
the proposition that Mary has just learnt that Carl Hempel is identical 
to himself– is obviously false: Mary always knew that Carl Hempel 
(=Peter Hempel) is identical to himself, and the fact that she was 
always willing to assent to an utterance that “Carl Hempel is Carl 
Hempel” is evidence of this. And, in turn, the members of the con-
versation know this and, if asked, they would deny that the minimal 
proposition just mentioned was communicated in the previous con-
text of utterance. Here, it would not only be strange to claim that this 
proposition has been asserted in spite of this, but also impossible to 
explain the assertion of the minimal proposition in the way Soames 
explains it in other cases in which he recognizes that the speaker does 
not have the primary intention of communicating it. In many cases, 
Soames claims, the more specific proposition(s) that the speaker 
asserts entail, in a way that is relatively obvious, the minimal proposi-
tion proposed as the semantic content of the uttered sentence, and so 
this last proposition is also asserted. In uttering (1) the speaker would 
have the primary intention of asserting and she would assert a pro-
position different from that which constitutes its semantic content, a 
proposition which (given the described situation) is true and ascribes 
to Mary the recent acquisition of a belief in a proposition with cer-
tain descriptive content.14 But in the case under consideration there is 
no such an entailment relation, since the conversational participants 
could, without being irrational, consider the minimal proposition an 
obvious falsehood in spite of considering true any information that 
they recognize as being asserted by means of the above mentioned 
utterance of (1).15
14 The proposition primarily asserted could be, for example, the proposition that Mary 
has just learnt that the man at the party known as “Peter Hempel” is the famous phi-
losopher of science Carl Hempel (Soames 2002 225-227).
15 Analogous considerations could be made about negations of propositional attitude 
reports like “Mary does not believe that Peter Hempel is Carl Hempel”.
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It seems that (1) and other similar sentences are seldom used to 
assert the proposition that Soames considers as its semantic content. 
Insofar as the conversational participants assume the rationality 
of the believer, only certain propositions with descriptive content 
would be asserted by uttering sentences like (1). Nevertheless, Soames 
(2002 233) claims that it is possible to assert a proposition by means 
of an utterance in certain cases where the speaker lacks the intention 
to communicate it and where neither she nor her audience are con-
scious of its communication; the assertion would occur in virtue of 
the interaction of a series of rules that govern the use of language. But 
this reply has two flaws. In the first place, it is not clear what it is to 
assert or communicate something that the speaker does not have the 
intention to communicate16 and is not transmitted to her audience. 
And, in the second place, insofar as Soames tries to circumscribe the 
rules that govern language practice using the notion of assertion, re-
sorting to these rules in order to explain the assertion of the minimal 
proposition in cases that prima facie constitute counterexamples to 
his account seems to be an illegitimate strategy.17
The described phenomenon is not reduced to sentences like the 
previous one. Consider the usual utterances of a sentence like (2).
(2) The waiter is efficient. 
Given the expressions that minimalism considers context 
sensitive, the description “the waiter” would not be so considered, 
and given minimalism’s acceptance of compositionality all context 
sensitivity would be syntactically traceable. Thus, as Clapp points 
out (265-266), given a Russellian analysis of descriptions we would be 
led to consider that they quantify over the whole universe, in which 
16 According to Soames (2002 83-84), there is a difference between the information that 
is communicated (in which the asserted one is included) and that which is imparted 
(in which we find the communicated information): while the transmission of the first 
one to the audience always depends on the speaker’s intention and the conversational 
presuppositions, the transmission of the second one does not necessary depend on 
these things. 
17 Soames could claim that these rules could be demarcated based on those cases where 
we do not have to appeal to them in order to explain the assertion of the minimal 
proposition, avoiding in this way the circularity charge. Thus, we could explain in a 
non-circular way how the semantic contents of the embedded sentence and the main 
clause in (1), on the one hand, and the compositional rules of the language, on the other, 
are delimited based on linguistic use, thus justifying the assignment of the minimal 
content to (1). Of course, developing such an explanation is not an easy task. In particu-
lar, it could be questioned that the sentence embedded in (1), namely “Peter Hempel is 
Carl Hempel”, is normally used to assert that Carl Hempel is identical to himself.
departamento de filosofía • facultad de ciencias humanas • universidad nacional de colombia
[10 6] MATÍAS GARIAZZO 
case (2) would be obviously false in all contexts due to the existence 
of more than one waiter. It seems clear that speakers hardly ever have 
–in Soames’ terms– the primary intention of asserting by means of 
an utterance of (2) the obviously false proposition that there is one 
and only one existent waiter in the universe and he is efficient, but 
would have instead the primary intention of asserting (presumably) 
true propositions about particular contextually salient waiters. And 
again, Soames cannot say here that the minimal proposition is en- 
tailed by the more specific proposition(s) that speakers have the pri-
mary intention of asserting, since it could happen that the second ones 
are true while the first one false.18 Then, he cannot claim that the first 
one is always asserted. 
Sentences that, like (3) and (4), contain quantifier expressions, 
give rise to the same problem.
(3) There is beer.
(4) There is no beer.
Given the expressions that minimalism considers context sensi-
tive and its acceptance of compositionality, these sentences would be 
context insensitive. Since there is no contextual restriction on the do-
main of quantification, they would semantically express, respectively, 
the proposition that there is beer in the universe and the proposition 
that there is no beer in the universe. Thus, in all contexts (3) would 
be true and (4) would be false. According to Soames’ view, speakers 
usually assert by uttering (3) more specific propositions that state 
that there is beer in a given particular place. Insofar as each of these 
propositions entails the minimal proposition that there is beer in the 
universe, we could explain the assertion of the latter proposition by 
resorting to the assertion of one of the former ones. However, we can-
not apply this strategy to the negation of (3), namely (4). It seems clear 
that speakers do not have –in Soames’ terms– the primary intention 
to assert by uttering (4) the obviously false proposition that there is no 
beer in the universe. Instead, by uttering (4), a speaker would have the 
primary intention of asserting a proposition that she considers true, 
presumably one that states that there is no beer in a certain particular 
place. Now, in this case there is no entailment relation between any 
of these more specific propositions and the minimal proposition that 
18 In turn, according to what would be a minimalist Fregean analysis of descriptions, 
(2) would usually express a proposition that obviously lacks a truth value, and so it 
would not be entailed by those (presumably) true ones that speakers have –in Soames’ 
terms– the primary intention of asserting. 
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justifies the supposition that the last one is always asserted: the simple 
fact that the minimal proposition is obviously false and the ones that 
speakers primarily assert are or could be true, shows that the second 
ones do not entail the first one.
Finally, the same problem arises from sentences like (5) and (6).
(5) John is ready.
(6) John is not ready.
According to minimalism, expressions like “is ready”, “is suffi-
cient” and “is tall”, do not belong to the set of context sensitive 
expressions, and consequently –given the acceptance of compositiona-
lity– the previous sentences’ truth conditions would be contextually 
invariant. Cappelen and Lepore (2005a 155-175) claim that these expres-
sions respectively express, in all contexts, the properties of being ready 
simpliciter, being sufficient simpliciter and being tall simpliciter, delega-
ting to the metaphysician the task of ascertaining what these properties 
exactly are. I shall make some remarks about this thesis advanced by 
Cappelen and Lepore later on. But before that, I will question the pro-
posal –suggested by several remarks made by Soames (2002)– that these 
expressions express certain properties that are unspecific in regard to 
the thing for which someone or something is ready, is sufficient, or is 
tall. According to this proposal, we could paraphrase the expressions 
under consideration in the following way: “is ready for something”, “is 
sufficient for something” and “is tall with respect to some comparative 
class”.19 Now, once this proposal is adopted, (5) and (6) give rise to the 
same inconvenient that we saw arises from (3) and (4). Given that it is 
certain that there would always be something for which John is ready, 
in every context (5) would be true and (6) false.20 For reasons analogous 
19 Borg (2007 350-351) explicitly proposes a quantificational analysis of these expressions.
20 I have considered that the negation that occurs in (6) –and also that which occurs in 
(4)– has wide scope, and in consequence that it can be paraphrased by (6’):
 (6’) There is no X, such that John is ready for X.
 But there is another possible construal of the negation that figures in (6) –and the same 
could be said about the negation which figures in (4) (Borg 2007 351). According to this 
construal, this negation has narrow scope, and so (6) could be paraphrased by (6’’):
 (6’’) There is an X, such that John is not ready for X.
 If we consider that the negation in (6) has narrow scope, it could be reasonable to claim 
that the minimal proposition assigned to (6) is asserted, since it would be entailed by 
the more specific propositions that speakers (primarily) assert by uttering this sen-
tence. But the problem also arises with sentences like “It is not the case that John is 
ready” and “It is false that John is ready”, where a construal in the line of (6’’) does 
not seem equally plausible. And surely, in every context speakers judge that these last 
sentences and (6) have the same truth value. Moreover, since it is implausible that the 
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to those presented with regard to (3) and (4), it could be claimed that 
the minimal proposition assigned to (5) is asserted by its utterances, 
but we cannot say the same thing about the minimal proposition as-
signed to (6). And of course, analogous considerations could be made 
about the application of this proposal to sentences that contain the ex-
pressions “is sufficient”, “is tall”, and others alike. 
As I pointed out, Cappelen and Lepore claim that expressions like 
“is ready”, “is sufficient” and “is tall” express simpliciter properties, 
whose nature is not something that philosophers of language must un-
cover, but something that should be uncovered by metaphysicians. As 
Harry Jackman (326) observes, this proposal is intelligible within an 
externalist conception about the content of an expression. According to 
such a conception, a speaker can refer to something –and also have the 
intention to do so– without knowing nearly anything about it, as has 
been claimed to happen with certain expressions –such as proper names 
and natural classes’ names– that Saul Kripke called rigid designators 
(1998). Then, it could be thought that just as we can assert a singular 
proposition without knowing hardly anything about an individual that 
composes such a proposition, so too can we assert propositions that 
contain these simpliciter properties, despite ignoring their nature.
But the analogy between the expressions that are typically consid-
ered rigid and these predicates cannot be established. The arguments 
in favor of the externalist treatment of expressions such as names of 
individuals and natural classes make use of two elements that are ab-
sent in the case of the above-mentioned predicates. In the first place, 
the uncontroversial existence of the entities proposed as these names’ 
contents. In support of the existence of natural classes, we can mention 
the possibility of increasing our knowledge about them shown by the 
existence of experts. On the contrary, it does not seem possible to know 
what exactly the previously mentioned simpliciter properties are. In the 
second place, as Kripke (71-105) shows, there are modal intuitions about 
the sentences in which names occur that give support to their externa-
list treatment. On the contrary, if we assume that the predicates under 
consideration express simpliciter properties, we will have no intuitions 
about the truth values in different possible circumstances of sentences 
like (5) and (6). Given the absence of these two elements in the case of 
these predicates, it is not possible to see how we could ground in their 
use the assignment of simpliciter properties as their semantic contents.
expressions “It is the case that” and “It is false that” have narrow scope when prefixed 
to most sentences, claiming that this is so in the particular case of the sentences whe-
re expressions like “is ready” occur seems to be ad hoc .
[10 9]Minimalism and Speakers’ Intuitions
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As I pointed out, the previous counterexamples to Soames’ ac-
count belong to the collection of cases whose treatment typically 
distinguishes minimalism from moderate contextualism. Thus, these 
counterexamples constitute an argument against minimalism, inso-
far as Soames’ account is the main and more developed one of this 
view available so far. I did not and will not say anything about the 
question of whether this explanation individuates semantic contents 
for other sentences; probably certain moderate contextualists consi-
der that it does, and it is clear that radical contextualists deny that it 
does for all or most of these other sentences. However, as I will point 
out in the next section, it is reasonable to infer from the objection just 
set forth a very general conclusion about the approach that a theory 
should have towards speakers’ intuitions about truth conditions.
III
The minimalist explanation we have considered tries to ground in 
linguistic practice the assignment of minimal semantic contents in a 
way that is compatible with the systematic divergence between these 
contents and the truth conditions that speakers intuitively assign. In 
order to achieve successful communication, speakers would not need 
to consciously discriminate the semantically expressed proposition 
amongst all the asserted propositions, and the intuitions that we have 
about truth conditions could be due to –and in the case of certain 
sentences they would always be due to– the assertion of some other(s) 
proposition(s) different from the one which constitutes the semantic 
content of the uttered sentence. But the cases just presented show the 
difficulty of disconnecting, at the same time, the semantic contents 
assigned to certain sentences from speakers’ intuitions about their 
truth conditions (or about their utterances’ truth conditions), and 
claiming that the propositions that are supposed to be semantically 
expressed are communicated by their utterances. Thus, this problem 
faced by minimalism shows the convenience of not systematically di-
vorcing whatever truth conditions we attribute to sentences in context 
from the truth conditions intuitively assigned by speakers.
This convenience is recognized by all non-minimalist views. Of 
course, there is disagreement among non-minimalist theories regard-
ing what intuitions speakers have and what treatment they deserve. 
Radical contextualists consider that insofar as it is not possible to 
device a truth conditional semantics but only a truth conditional 
pragmatics for natural languages, these intuitions directly reveal the 
only truth conditions that can be reasonably assigned to sentences 
in context. On the other hand, while some moderate contextualists 
(Stanley 200) seem to think that all these intuitions can be directly 
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accounted for by semantics, others (Ezcurdia) consider that the 
availability of a truth conditional semantics is revealed by certain sys-
tematicity that our intuitions about truth conditions have, which is 
compatible with the fact that such a semantics does not respect these 
intuitions in certain circumstances. The analysis of these alternatives, 
which is necessary for assessing the relevance of speakers’ intuitions 
for a theory of natural language, goes beyond the scope of this essay.
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